The case of People v Hall, (a case appealed by Matthew C. Hug, Esq. -- the author of Slip Op.), presented the issue of whether a spontaneous statement exception exists in subsequent Miranda statement scenarios. In Hall, the defendant had been interrogated by police officers for approximately five hours -- without being Mirandized -- concerning a rash of burglaries officers believed he was a participant. Defendant was kept in an interrogation room for the entirety of the evening, save for a single cigarette break. At the end of the interrogation, defendant signed a written statement confessing to a number of burglaries.
At the immediate conclusion of the signing of the written statement, a fellow officer -- whom had been in the interrogation room for the entire interrogation -- issued defendant his Miranda warnings. According to the officer, while he was conducting the booking procedure, defendant asked which crime he was being charged with, to which the officer replied "the one with the basement window." Defendant then retorted "oh yeah, some old lady was knocking on the window and shewed (sic) me away."
At the suppression hearing, County Court suppressed the written statement as it was taken prior to the Miranda warning was issued. The Court, however, refused to supress the oral statement during the booking procedures claiming that it was a spontaneous statement and immune from the rules relating to subsequent Mirandized statements.
Briefly digressing, it is well settled that statements -- in order to be effective, must be preceded by Miranda warnings. Where, however, "an improper, unwarned statement gives rise to a subsequent Mirandized statement as part of a 'single chain of events,' there is inadequate assurance that the Miranda warnings were effective in protecting a defendant's rights, and the warned statement must also be suppressed" (People v Paulman, 5 NY3d 122, 130 [2005]). That is not to say that the subsequent statement may never be admissible, as it can be if said subsequent statement is made following a "pronounced break in questioning so as to provide the defendant with sufficient time to reflect upon the situation and return him or her to the status of one who is not under the influence of questioning'" (People v Durrin, 32 AD3d 665, 668 [2006], quoting People v Chapple, 38 NY2d 112, 115 [1975]).
Against the well settled backdrop, came the distinct wrinkle in this case. If a statement is characterized as spontaneous, despite the fact that it follows an un-Mirandized confession, can it be admitted without recourse to the Paulman and Chapple standard? The Appellate Division found that any statement, even if characterized as spontaneous, must be viewed through the lens of Paulman and Chapple, if it is given following an un-Mirandized confession.
In this case, the Court found that defendant's statement to police was given in such a close temporal proximity to the unwarned confession, that County Court erred in refusing to suppress the statement based upon its determination that it was spontaneous. Thus, whenever a Mirandized statement is made in close temporal proximity to an un-Mirandized statement, the courts must engage in the Chapple analysis even if the statement is characterized as spontaneous.
